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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The factual picture involved in this subject case 
1s without dispute for the purposes of this appeal. 
They are contained in the Amended Complaint of thl' 
plaintiff as filed in this proceeding. 
The plaintiff purchased a factory for the manu-
facture and repair of guns which factory was situated 
in Trinidad, Colorado. Plaintiff was in the market 
to obtain a lease on premises in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
to which this factory could be moved and installed. 
Thereafter one Robert P. Woolley, a real estate 
agent and broker brought the plaintiff and defendant 
together to discuss a lease on property situated at 1·3-34 
South Second "\Vest Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
During the course negotiations concerning the 
lease of the property Mr. Wycoff, the defendant, 
represented to the plaintiff that he owned the said 
prernises, and on or about the 9th day of August en-
tered into an oral lease agreement, the terms of 
which are set out in the Amended Complaint of the 
plaintiff. 
Thereafter the defendant, Mr. \!Vycoff, in the 
presence of the plaintiff instructed his attorney to 
draw up a written lease covering the agreement as 
made. 
Defendant exercised other rights of ownership in 
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3 
the property over a period of the next few weeks, as 
indicated by the amended complaint, and at all times 
led the plaintiff to believe, that the defendant was in 
fact the owner of the property, and that the property 
was under lease to plaintiff and that a written evi-
dence of that lease would be forthcoming. 
Based upon the presentations made by the 
defendant, plaintiff went into possession of the 
property and caused the factory and equipment here-
tofore mentioned to be brought upon the premises and 
installed thereon. 
As an actual fact, it later developed that the de-
fendant, Mr. Wycoff, was not the owner of the pro-
perty, that he was negotiating for the purchase there-
of, and that he subsequently terminated his agree-
ment to purchase the property from its owner. It 
appears that the election to not proceed with the pur-
chase was a matter of defendants own volition, the 
seller having remained willing t_o carry out the terms 
of the agreement. 
The plaintiff did not discover the facts with 
reference to the true ownership of the real property 
until some time after the installation of his gun 
factory in the premises. 
Upon discovery of the facts as indicated above, 
the plaintiff was faced with the problem of either 
removing his gun factory from the premises at con-
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siderable expense to himself or negotiating with the 
true owner of the property, Bessie Friedman. Plaintiff 
was not informed of the decision of the Defendant not 
to purchase the property until approximately Septenl-
ber 1·1, 19-51, and prior to that time at all times 
thought that the defendant was the owner of the 
property. 
After the discovery in reference to ownership, 
the extreme cost in both time and money which 
would be necessitated in the event of another movP 
of the equipment, its dismanteling and reinstallation, 
plaintiff negotiated the best possible lease he could 
with Bessie Friedman. 
The damages which appellant seeks herein repl~e­
sent the increased cost and charges in connection with 
the Friedman lease, together with the additional ex-
penses which plaintiff was required to undertake 
under the Friedman lease, and which were in excess 
of the expenditures .required under the lease with 
the defendant. 
For the convenience of the Court, and since on 
motion for summary judgment the facts as plead 
constitute the facts of the case, plaintiff sets out 
hereinafter the pertinent facts of his Amended Com-
plaint. 
1. That on or a bout August 9, 1 q-s1, defendant 
represented to plaintiff that he was the owner of 
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5 
certain premises at 1554 South Second West Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and that he had purchased the 
same from Bessie Friedman and was in control and 
possession thereof; that on or about the said 9th day 
of August, 1951, plaintiff and defendant entered into 
an oral lease agreement by the terms of which de-
fendant leased to the plaintiff the said premises for 
a period of ten years from date of possession at a 
monthly rental of $400.00 per month, the same being 
the front 12,000 square feet of a building, together 
with an area for parking and access between the 
building and Second vVest Street on the front and 
east, defendant to install offices, show room, and toilet 
accommodations in the front portion of the building 
in a location and of a construction orally agreed upon 
by the parties and at defendant's expense, defendant 
to install a steam boiler heating system orally agreed 
upon by the parties at defendant's expense, defen-
dant to install certain electrical lines and fixtures 
orally agreed upon by the parties at defendant's ex-
pense, and plaintiff to have possession on or before 
September 1. 19S1. 
2. That during the negotiations for the said 
lease and at the time of the lease agreement aforesaid, 
plaintiff informed defendant that he required the 
leased premises for the operation therein of a manu-
facturing establishment and that plaintiff had pur-
chased the lathes, machines and equipment for the 
said factory at Trinidad, Colorado, and intended to 
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move the same into the leased premises on or beforp 
September 1, 19:31. 
3. That on or about August 16, 19:31, the dP-
fendant and the plaintiff visited the premises in conl-
pany with Mr. \Yayne C. Durharn, defendant's 
attorney, and then and there orally agreed as to tht' 
exact location for the construction of office acconlnlO-
dations and other improvernents to be installed by the 
defendant and the defendant then and there and in 
the presence of the plaintiff instructed his said 
attorney to draw up and present a written lease to the 
plaintiff setting forth the details of the oral agreernent 
theretofore made between the parties; that the plain-
tiff believed that the said agreement would be re-
duced to writing by the defendant's attorney in ac-
cordance \Vith said instructions. 
4. That on or about August 20, 1951 defendant 
visited the leased premises with plaintiff and with one 
Ben H. Davis, a licensed general contractor and then 
and there defendant represented to plaintiff that he 
was the owner of the said premises and in possession 
and control thereof and in plaintiff's presence defen-
dant employed the said contractor to install the said 
offices, show roorn, toilet facilities and other improve-
ments as agreed ·upon between the pa-rties and in 
conformity with the terms of the proposed lease and 
represented to the plaintiff that the same would be 
installed by the said contractor at defendant's expense 
and pursuant to the aforesaid lease agreement. 
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:J. That further that on or about August 20, 
1951, the defendant again represented to the plaintiff 
that he was the purchaser and owner of the said leas-
ed premises and in control and possession of the same 
and then and there and in the presence of the plaintiff 
and the plaintiff's son, Don Easton and in the pres-
ence of Albert Friedman and Willie Friedman, the 
sons of Bessie Friedman, frorn whom defendant had 
alleged he had purchased the said property, notified 
the said Albert Friedman and Willie Friedman that 
the said defendant had entered into a lease agree-
Inent with plaintiff as herein set forth under the 
terms of which plaintiff was entitled to occupy and 
take possession on September 1, 1951 and then and 
there instructed the said Friedmans to remove their 
personal property from the leased premises and from 
defendant's property and in no event later than 
September 1, 1951, in order that plaintiff could move 
his equipment and factory into and upon the leased 
premises and occupy the same pursuant to the afore-
said lease agreement. 
6. That further and on or about August 20, 
1951~ defendant represented to plaintiff that he was 
the purchaser and owner and in possession and con-
trol of the said leased premises and instructed the 
plaintiff that he could move his equipment and 
machinery and factory into and upon the leased 
premises as soon as plaintiff could obtain and arrange 
for transportation thereof from Trinidad, Colorado. 
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7. That on or about August 13, 19·)1, the de-
fendant stated to one Robert P. Woolley, the real 
estate agent and broker who had negotiated the real 
estate agreement between plaintiff and defendant~ 
that it would not be necessary for the said broker to 
employ an attorney to reduce the oral lease agree-
ment to writing and that the defendant had a retain-
ed company attorney, and that the defendant had 
instructed and employed the said attorney to pre-
pare a written lease agreement setting forth the terms 
orally agreed on between the parties and that the 
said written lease containing said terms would be 
delivered to the said broker and delivered to the plain-
tiff; and the said Robert P. Woolley thereafter 
prou1ptly reported this statement and information to 
plaintiff who believed the same to be true and who 
believed accordingly that a lease agreement was be-
ing prepared by defendant's attorney in conformity 
vvith the oral agree1nent theretofore entered into be-
tween the parties. 
8. That each of the representations and state-
Inents of the defendant aforesaid was made with the 
full knowledge and intention that the plaintiff would 
believe and rely upon the same and that in reliance 
thereon plaintiff would cause his machinery and 
factory and equipment to be moved from Trinidad, 
Colorado, into and upon the leased premises on or 
about September 1, 1951; that at all times afore-
Inentioned the defendant well knew that he had not 
~ : ]I 
\11 
:I( 
1/ 
1.! 
.I" II 
'li] 
• 
1:al 
l[d] 
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purchased and was not the owner of or in possession 
or control of the above described leased premises and 
and knew that his representations to the contrary to 
the plaintiff were false and untrue; that on or about 
August 21, 1951, the defendant was advised by one 
Newell Dayton of Tracy Collins Trust Company that 
a tax lien for unpaid taxes due from Bessie Friedman 
was an outstanding encumbrance against the above 
described property and instructed his attorney Wayne 
C. Durham to investigate the validity of the said tax 
lien; that on or about August 22, 1951, the defendant 
formulated a conviction that he would not acquire the 
said premises and that the title could not be cleared 
from the said lien to the satisfaction of the defendant; 
that notwithstanding his inforrnation and conviction 
aforesaid, the defendant wholly and entirely failed 
and neglected to advise or in any manner instruct the 
plaintiff that he was not to move his equipment upon 
the leased premises or that the defendant had deter-
mined not to complete his purchase of the premises or 
that the defendant was not in fact the owner of and 
entitled to the control and possession of the said 
premises. 
9. That by reason of the aforesaid facts, state-
r.aents and representations of the defendant, plaintiff 
vvas induced to believe and did believe that the defen-
dant had purchased from Bessie Friedman and was 
the owner of the above described premises and in 
control of the same and entitled to lease the same to 
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the plaintiff for occupancy effective Septernber 1, 
1951. In accordance with such belief and under-
standing and in reliance upon defendant's repre-
se_ntations and statements, plaintiff caused his 
machinery and factory equipment to be moved frmn 
Trinidad, Colorado into and upon the leased premises 
and caused the same to be assembled and installed 
therein between September 1, and September+, 1951.· 
10. That thereafter and on about September 15, 
1951, defendant stated to plaintiff that he had 
decided not to complete_ his purchase of the leased 
premises from Bessie Friedman and that the defend-
ant would make no further written lease with plain-
tiff and that plaintiff was accordingly upon the Fried-
rnan property and not upon the property of the 
defendant and that defendant had no further interest 
in the property and that if plaintiff was to remain up-
on the property it would be necessary for him to enter 
into a suitable lease or purchase agreement with the 
Friedman ovvners. 
11. That thereafter plaintiff negotiated a lease 
agreement for the aforesaid leased premises with the 
owners thereof, to-wit, Albert and Bessie Friedman, 
on the best terms and conditions the plaintiff could 
obtain, but that the said lease "'as less valuable to 
plaintiff than the lease agreement aforesaid with 
defendant, in the following particulars and with darn-
age to the plaintiff as folloV\·s: 
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a. Under the Fried1nan lease, plaintiff., 
rather than the landlord, was obliged to install 
the required electrical lines and fixtures, and 
the same were installed by plaintiff at a cost 
and damage to the plaintiff in the sum of 
$4,500.00. 
b. Under the Friedman lease plaintiff, 
rather than the landlord, was obliged to install 
the offices, show room, and toilet facilities, and 
the same were installed by plaintiff at a cost 
and damange to plaintiff in the sum of 
$4,200.00. 
c. Under the Friedman lease the land-
lord installed a heating system which was not a 
steam boiler, but was a propane gas installa-
tion, and the cost of the fuel for the said system 
amounts to $300.00 per year more than the 
cost of fuel for the system which defendant 
agreed to install, to the damage of the plain-
tiff over the 10-year period of the lease in the 
sum of $3,000.00 
d. That the rental under the Friedman 
lease is the sum of $450.00 per month, where-
as the defendant agreed to lease the san1e or 
better premises and appurtenances at a rental 
of $400.00 per month, to the damage of the 
plaintiff over the 1 0-year period of the lease in 
the sum of $6,000.00. 
12. That the fair market value of the said prem-
ises and the basis upon which they could have been 
leased from the owners prior to the time plaintiff en-
tered upon the said premises and installed his machin-
ery and factory equipment thereon was the same basis 
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at which plaintiff entered into the original oral lease 
agreement with the defendant as hereinabove srt 
forth in paragraph one; and that the increased cost 
and charge in connection with the Friedman lease 
\vas the result of plaintiff being upon the premises 
with his factory at the time of negotiations for thr 
said lease with the said Friedmans, and is in exn'ss 
of the fair market value of the said premises, to 
the damage of the plaintiff in the sum of $17,700.00 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against 
the defendant for the sum of $17,700.00, costs of suit, 
interest and such other and further relief as to the 
Court appears proper. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The representations made by the defendant to the plaintiff 
gave rise to an estoppel in pais precluding the defendant from 
asserting the Statute of Frauds as a defense. __ The trial court 
erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment 
and to dismiss. 
II. The representations made by the defendant that he could and 
should take immediate possession of the property, and that 
a written lease would be prepared embodying the terms of 
the oral agreement, gave rise to a promissory estoppel which 
precludes the defendant from asserting the Statute of Frauds 
as a defense. The trial court erred in granting defendant's 
motion for summary judgment and to dismiss. 
Ill. Plaintiff's complaint states a good cause of action sounding in 
In tort, for fraudulent misrepresentation. The trial court erred 
in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and 
to dismiss. 
?il 
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POINT I. 
The representations made by the defendant gave 
rise to an estoppel in pais precluding the defendant from 
asserting the Statute of Frauds as a defense. The trial 
court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary 
judgment and to dismiss. 
The Trial Court when it considered the motion 
for summary judgment which it granted the defend-
ant in this case, had before it the recent decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court of Raverino us. Price (Utah) 260 
Pac. 2nd. 5 70, and concluded that the Raverino case 
was controlling in this case. 
It is plaintiff's contention that the Raverino case 
is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar, and the 
principles of law enunciated therein are in fact favor-
able to plaintiff's position. 
The matter involved, that is, the application of 
the Statute of Frauds to the present situation is, of 
course, paramount here as it was in the Raverino 
case, although the problem involved here is a lease 
of real property rather than the purchase of real 
property. 
Appellant takes the position that the defendant 
under the facts of this case is estopped to plead or raise 
as a defense, the statute of frauds, based upon the lack 
of a writing herein. The principle underlying estoppel 
cases under circumstances such as herein involved is 
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perhaps best stated in Utah MPITur Gold Mining 
Co. v. Hershel Gold Mining Co., 103 Utah 249, 1 )·1· 
P. 2nd. 1094 as follovvs: 
"Whether the legalla bel given to the basis 
of plaintiffs' claimed right to continue in 
possession of the property is equitable estoppel, 
irrevocable license, or an oral contract for a 
written extension taken out of the statute of 
frauds because of partial performance is not so 
important. These concepts are but forms de-
signed to serve a more ultimate principle that 
no one shall induce another to act on promise 
of reward for such act and then after obtain-
ing the benefit of the same repudiate the con-
tract." 
The Court in the Raverino case had before it tlw 
1\0l 
~ I I P I 
question of a promissory estoppel, based upon a repre- 111 !1 
sentation as to a future event, that is, transfer of cer-
tain property. In that case the defendant obtained :t!m 
no advantage from the reliance by the plaintiff upon .lull 
the representation, and in fact the change of position 
that occurred was meTely the fact that the plaintiff 
suffered a questionable detriment in purchasing ·,dtl 
adjoining property in reliance upon the promise of the :!trJ 
defendant. Actually plaintiff in the Ravarino case ~:u 
suffered no detriment since the property which he 1·1 
purchased could be sold as the facts of that case indi- ctll 
cate, for as much as he paid for the property. 
This factual picture serves to point out the very ,el 
broad difference which distinguishes the case' at bar. 
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In the present case the defendant was in fact 
negotiating for the purchase of the property located 
at .1554 South Second West, and the advantage to be 
gained by him, arising out of his representation as to 
his ownership of the premises, and representation as 
to the lease of the premises is very clear. By making 
these representations, he in fact secured a tenant for 
the property so that upon his purchase thereof he 
would suffer no· period of loss of rental of the 
property, but in fact had a substantial tenant on the 
pren1ises from the date of his purchase of the 
property. The detriment to the plaintiff is, of course: 
very clear. Having placed himself in a position in 
reliance upon the representations of the defendant 
where he could be greatly injured, he had no alter-
native but to negotiate with the true owner of the 
premises on the best basis which it was possible for 
him to obtain, after discovery of the misrepresenta-
tions. 
The situation then was one where the party to 
whom the representations were made, relied upon 
them; the representations were made for the purpose 
of obtaining the reliance of the plaintiff thereon, and 
they were done by the defendant for his own ad-
vantage. 
Whereas in the Raverino case the defendant 
(seller) obtained no advantage by the representa-
tion since he had no interest in the "Terry Strip" be-
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ing purchased or not purchased, in the present C<ls(• 
the lessor obtained a very valuable advantage, had he 
elected to proceed as he represented to the plaintiff, 
that he had done. 
It appears that the estoppel hPre involved is in 
fact a true estoppel based upon misrepresentation of 
an existing fact. The misrepresentation being: 1. A 
misrepresentation as to ownership and right to lease 
the same; 2. A misrepresentation as to the state of ',dH 
rnind of the defendant when he instructed his :n] 
attorney to draft the lease. ,,(o 
The first misrepresentation is clearly one of an 
existing fact, and which was false. 
The second misrepresentation was a nlisrepre-
sentation as to the state of mind of the defendant, 
that is, an indication to the plaintiff that a lease 
would be drawn by his attorney when in fact he had 
no such fixed intention and vvhen in fact he knew 
that he could not have such a fixed intention since 
at that time he had no actual proper right to give 
such a lease. For this reason appellant takes the posi-
tion that this latter misrepresentation undoubtedly 
makes a misrepresentation as to the state of mind 
under which the defendant vvas proceeding. This 
would bring the case \vithin the rule announced in 
the case Elliott v. Whitmore, 23 Utah 342, 65 Pac. 70. 
!]t 
::a1 
1''10] 
101/i 
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POINT II. 
The representations made by the defendant that he 
could take immediate possession and that the written 
lease would be prepared, gave rise to a promissory 
estoppel which precluded the defendant from asserting 
the Statute of Frauds as a defense. The trial court erred in 
granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and 
to dismiss. 
For the purpose of this appeal it is immaterial 
whether the estoppel actually constituted an estoppel 
in pais or whether the estoppel is a promissory 
estoppel. That is to say, the facts justify the use of 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel as a means of 
granting the plaintiff relief. 
The application of the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel is well illustrated by the case of Interstate 
Company us. Bry-Block Mercantile Company, 30 Fed 
2nd. 172. In that ca~e relief was granted the plaintiff 
under circumstances where the President of the 
defendant corporation had told the plaintiff that he 
would sjgn the contract of lease involved and re-
quested them to act as though the contract was 
already signed and urged them to proceed with the 
opening of a business in the premises. Based upon 
these facts the plaintiff took possession, bought 
Hxtures and made improvements on the premises. 
The analogy to the case at bar is clear. The 
plaintiff relied upon the representations of the 
defendant that he could take possession of the prem-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
Another case illustrating the same principal is 
the case of Seymour vs. Oelrichs, 1:56 Cal. 782, 106 
Pac. 88. In that case the Court allowed a recovery on 
a contract where the plaintiff gave up a life position 
to work for the defendant on the promise of the 
defendant to execute a written ten year employment 
contract, and not to rely on the statute of frauds. The 
court held in substance that it was manifest fraud 
which justified the application of the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel. See also Hunter l'S. Sparling 
· (Calif.) 197 Pac. 807; Tchula Commerce Co. vs. Jack-
son, 1 + 7 Miss. 296, 111 Southern 8 7 +. 
The Trial Court had in mind the dicta announced 
by the Supreme Court in the Raverino case, and con-
sequently was reluctant to review this matter favor-
ably from the standpoint of the cases cited above. 
It is submitted by the plaintiff that the reasons 
for the extension of the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel to the extent recognized by 2 vVilliston 
(Revised Edition) 1554, Section 333 are compelling, 
and in the present case should certainly be reviewed 
favorably by the Court. At the above citation the 
author states as follows: 
"Doctrine of promissory estoppel has al-
ways been extended to permit recovery on the 
contract by one \vho has relied to his detriment 
on the pron1ise of the defendant to execute and 
deliver a sufficient memorandum." 
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The principal is enunciated clearly in the Re-
statement of Contracts, Section 90, wherein it is said: 
"A promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to produce action or for-
bearance of a definite and substantial char-
acter on the part of the promisee and which 
thus induces such action or forbearance is 
binding if injustice can be avoided only be en-
forcement of the promise." 
The injustice involved in the present case is such 
that the Court should estop the defendant from plead-
ing or relying upon the statute of frauds and allow 
the enforcement of the present suit for damages. The 
plaintiff expended large sums of money, bound him-
self to an unsatisfactory contract of lease requiring 
payment of more monies than the property was 
reasonably worth, simply because he was at the 
mercy of the owner of the property. This situation 
was created by the misrepresentation of the defend-
ant, that he owned the property, that the plaintiff 
should take possession thereof, and that a written 
lease would follo·w. 
The election on the part of the defendant not to 
proceeed with the purchase of the property placed 
the plaintiff in this unsatisfactory situation, yet the 
plaintiff was relying upon representations of the 
defendant, and the defendant had the advantage of 
a tenant in possession if, as and when he elected to 
proceed with the contract of purchase. Since he volun-
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tarily withdrew from the purchase of the property, he .1111 
certainly should not be allowed to claim that the ,111li 
benefit was not actually realized because he did not '.it! 
become the owner of the leased premises. As stated in n'f 
Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88: rtif 
"Here certainly ... was a representation 
of a future intention absolute in form, de-
liberately made for the purpose of influencing 
the conduct of the other party ... " 
''While the question is by no means free 
from doubt, we believe that it should be held 
that there were sufficient facts to support a 
conclusion that the promise here to give such 
a written agreement as was required by the 
statute was made under such circumstances 
that the irrevocable surrender by plaintiff of 
his position in the police department in full 
reliance thereon made it, in the eye of equity, 
a binding contract, the subsequent repudiation 
of which by defendants would constitute such 
a manifest fraud as would justify the applica-
tion of the doctrine of equitable estoppel." 
As stated by Chief Justice Wolfe in the Raverino 
case in discussing this point: 
"The binding thread which runs through 
these cases, distinguishing them from the gen-
eral rule that a mere promise as to future con-
duct will not work an estoppel, is the promise 
designedly made to influence the conduct of 
pro1nisee ... " Citalics Added) 
The assertion of the defendant that his counsel 
:Ita! 
.!~01 
filii 
I ~ 
'1Jllf 
:J~! 
I 
!fiilll 
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would draw up the lease, and that the written lease 
\Yould be forthcoming, place this case on a parallel 
\Yith the Interstate Company vs. Bry-Block Mer. Co. 
case, 30 Fed. 2d. 172, and the Seymour vs. Oelrichs, 
case, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88. It is earnestly submitted 
that the case at bar factually is exactly the situation 
about which Chief Justice \Volfe wrote when he 
penned the language quoted above. 
POINT III. 
Plaintiff's. complaint states a good cause of action 
sounding in tort, for fraudulent misrepresentation. The 
trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment and to dismiss. 
Appellant believes and asserts that his amended 
cmnplaint states a cause of action sounding in tort, 
thatjs a cause of action for fraud and deceit stemming 
from the misrepresentations made him by the re-
spondent with the intent that he rely there on, and 
relied up0n to his detriment. 
Under such a view of the case, the Statute of 
Frauds has no effect or bearing on the case, and is not 
assertable as a defense thereto. 
That the representations made by the defendant 
with respect to his ownership of the property were 
representations as to existing n1atters of fact is clear. 
As alleged by the complaint, and for the purpose of 
this appeal, to be taken as true, the defendant asserted 
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to the plaintiff that he had purchased the property 
from Bessie Freidman, that he was in control of the 
property, and that he could and did lease the property 
to the plaintiff .. Plaintiff took possession of the 
property in reliance thereon, as the defendant in-
tended that he should, and suffered extreme damages 
because of the false statements knowingly made by 
the defendant. 
As stated in 23 Am. Jur. 816, sec. 50: 
"The general rule is well settled that false 
statements or representations as to the title, or 
the character of one's title to real estate, made 
for the purpose of inducing some business 
transaction or dealing in coniJ.ection therewith, 
constitute actionable fraud, and may be the 
basis ... for an action in tort for damages ... " 
The general rule ... has been applied to a false 
representation by the representer that h!has 
a good title when in fact he has no title ... 
This principle also applies to false representa-
tions or statements as to ownership. 
It is equally clear, that for the purpose of pro-
ceeding at law for damages for the fraudulent mis-
representations, that the representations and the 
contract entered into are distinct and separable, 23 
Am. Jur. 776, sec. 23. 
For the purpose of this appeal, the damages 
suffered by the plaintiff under this theory is the 
difference between the fair rental price which the 
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property would and should have brought under 
normal circumstances, and the price which plaintiff 
was required to pay by reason of the fact that the 
defendant through his fraudulent misrepresentations 
placed the plaintiff in a position where he could be 
and was seriously injured. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully and earnestly asserted by the 
Appellant that he has suffered great damage in his 
business operations by reason of the activities and 
representations of the Respondent, as more particu-
larly set forth herein, and that those representations 
were made under circumstances calculated to be for 
the benefit of the Respondent in making the same; 
that it would be highly unjust to allow the Respond-
ent to be freed from the responsibility that should 
attend the making of those representations, by affirm-
ing the holding of the lower court. It is further 
asserted that the factual basis justifying the award 
of damages based upon those representations is amply 
established by plaintiff's complaint. The trial court 
felt constrained to follow the interpretation which 
he placed upon the Ravarino case, the Appellant feels 
that in this the trial court erred. In legal principle 
the Ravarino case supports Appellant in this case, 
and factually the cases are clearly distinguishable. 
In the Ravarino case there is a discussion of promis-
sory estoppel without any definite conclusion thereon, 
but indicated the basis therefor. The discussion 
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appears to be in the form of dicta, since the case is 
decided upon another point, that is, that the elements 
of a promissory estoppel are lacking. In the present 
case, those elements are present, and it is earnestly 
asserted that the facts justify the upholding of plain-
tiff's complaint on any of the theories thereof asserted 
by plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OWEN, WARD, SHEFFIELD 
& GREENWOOD 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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